Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have generated over 137,000 civilian casualties in the past decade, more than any other explosive weapon system in the same period with a far-reaching impact on personal security freedoms across 50 affected countries. The aim of this paper is to consolidate existing risk management processes to control the availability of chemical precursors used in the manufacture of home-made explosives (HME) and to recommend global standards for market regulations in their composition, sale and use. This will be achieved by assessing the current regional regulations for three common chemical precursors (hydrogen peroxide, ammonium nitrate and potassium chlorate), and proposing a risk management process to identify key precursor chemicals that require greater control.
Civil engineers and explosives experts theorizing about what could have caused the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in southern Ukraine are starting to coalesce around the idea that it was a deliberate attack rather than a structural fault.
Brimstone Consultancy Limited is pleased to have assisted Laura Cobham in this article for the Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction. But, what’s it all about?
Humanitarian mine action (HMA) and humanitarian forensic action (HFA) have had a global impact in recent decades. However, these two areas could work more closely together in view of some of the contexts in which they operate. Often when HMA operators clear explosive ord- nance (EO) after conflict, they find human remains, especially in urban areas. When human remains are encountered, they must be dealt with appropriately. In the event that HMA and HFA actors are present in a humanitarian arena, there is a need for an increased awareness and understanding of each other’s role. Similarly, forensic sci- entists working to recover human remains may encounter mines, improvised explo- sive devices (IEDs), or explosive remnants of war (ERW), and they should also actively enable HMA support. This article examines the extent of the cooperation to date and identifies ways in which it can be improved. Recommendations and practical measures are provided to encourage a higher degree of collaboration going forward.
Capacity development is at the core of UNDP’s work world-wide, and at the core of its role in the mine action sector. The purpose of this handbook is to capture the wealth of UNDP’s experience of developing capacities in mine action programming, and guide on how it can be applied in any context. The guidance in this handbook is intended for the entire mine action sector, including all mine action practitioners from UNDP and the entire UN family, national counterparts and operators on the ground.
Brimstone Consultancy is pleased to share with our community the IED disposal good practice guide in Arabic for use by humanitarian definers
Oksana Markarova, Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States, has accused Russia of using a vacuum bomb during its invasion. However, there has been no official confirmation of this claim. There have also been reported sightings of thermobaric rocket launchers in Ukraine in late February 2022. Given Russian forces are trying to take control of the capital, Kyiv, and other large cities in the east of the country, it is suspected their use is likely in Ukraine.
Of current concern in Ukraine is if the Russian army deploy their TOS-1 (Russian: тяжёлая огнемётная система [ТОС-1], Heavy Flamethrower System) weapon systems to deliver thermobaric attacks. The TOS-1 is a Soviet 220 mm 30-barrel (TOS-1M) or 24-barrel (TOS-1A) multiple thermobaric weapon launcher mounted on a T-72 tank chassis. The devastation this would cause if fired into cities would be immense.
The concern about the use of such weapons largely stems from the fact that they are far more lethal than other conventional explosive weapons of similar calibre, and cause horrific injuries.
This is in large part because they withdraw oxygen from the air around them to create an explosion with a longer blast wave that burns at a much higher temperature. Developed in the mid-20th century, vacuum bombs have been used by global powers such as the US in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The widespread use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has been documented extensively by the mine action sector over the last decade1. Together with this trend is the use of home-made explosives (HMEs). Although not all IEDs include an HME component, the frequency of their use and the specific operational challenges related to HMEs and their chemical precursors, have highlighted the need to document good practice related to this lesser-known category of explosives.
The importance of addressing HMEs is clear. They pose a threat to human life and to the environment. There is also a significant risk that mine action (MA) personnel will encounter HMEs in affected countries, whether in improvised explosive devices (IEDs), in abandoned manufacturing or storage sites, or as stockpiles of precursor chemicals used in a variety of industries. The severity of the impact of HMEs coupled with a high likelihood of encountering them in certain settings, led to the decision to develop guidance that is focused on HMEs.
Given the risks involved for those in encountering HMEs and potentially interacting with them, the GICHD has developed Chapter 5 of the Improvised Explosive Device Clearance Good Practice Guide with the aim of improving the safety of mine action personnel as a first priority, but also ensuring that mine action programmes are dealing with this particular threat effectively to keep communities safe from their effects. This guidance therefore provides an important component of the mine action knowledge necessary to conduct IED search and disposal activities within the IED clearance process in relevant settings.
Our aims for this chapter have been addressed by presenting technical information on HMEs that will promote an increased understanding of these substances, including: the raw materials that compose HMEs; the ability to recognise their presence; the physical and chemical characteristics of HMEs; their potential to generate non-explosive hazards, such as toxicity; and, safety considerations for mine action personnel who are likely to encounter HMEs (such as Personal Protection Equipment (PPE)).
In order to strengthen and reinforce the knowledge about HMEs and their chemical precursors in the MA sector, this publication presents a wide variety of HMEs that can be encountered in operational contexts, and the chemical compositions used in their explosive train. Apart from discussing the more common HME groups (chlorates, perchlorates, nitrates and peroxides), substantial information has been provided on less commonly found mixtures, as well as on improvised pyrotechnics, improvised incendiary compositions and improvised primary explosives.
This chapter is neither a research publication nor a comprehensive technical manual; it rather aims to provide condensed content in an easy-to-read format. Visual aids and images of these chemical compositions are provided throughout the chapter to reinforce the learning process. The content has been chosen to provide practical knowledge to mine action practitioners, based on the most common HME threats they will encounter. Theoretical knowledge of the very basic chemistry of explosives and their chemical precursors provides the foundation of this document. Detailed scientific information, such as complex equations and formula have been avoided. Definitions and derivations have also been simplified to provide only the most essential information for end-users.
It is hoped that the technical knowledge presented in this chapter will be a useful operational resource that enables MA personnel to meet their primary needs for identifying and assessing chemical behaviour, as well as the risks related to non-explosive hazards. At the same time, reliable and accessible technical information also provides the foundations for high quality national standards, operational procedures, and policy documentation. We therefore hope that this chapter also proves useful in terms of developing the frameworks for MA programmes where IEDs are present.
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have generated over 137,000 civilian casualties in the past decade, more than any other explosive weapon system in the same period with a far-reaching impact on personal security freedoms across 50 affected countries. The aim of this paper is to consolidate existing risk management processes to control the availability of chemical precursors used in the manufacture of home-made explosives (HME) and to recommend global standards for market regulations in their composition, sale and use. This will be achieved by assessing the current regional regulations for three common chemical precursors (hydrogen peroxide, ammonium nitrate and potassium chlorate), and proposing a risk management process to identify key precursor chemicals that require greater control.
On 21st November 2019, Landmine Monitor published the disturbing rise in casualty rates from improvised landmines. Improvised landmines were cited as being responsible for over half of all victims, and nearly double the figure of 2013. However, the terminology being used within humanitarian mine action relating to mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) may also be misleading from an explosive engineering standards perspective. It got me thinking of my own experience during an assurance visit to an IED search and clearance mission in al-Maydan District in 2018, and further reflection throughout 2019 and 2020 as a Governance and Peace Building advisor to the Yemen Conflict. It is hoped that the link below provides a useful narrative to inform donors and implementers of the difference between improvised mines and IEDs – there is a clear distinction, yet IEDs continue to be misunderstood.
https://iexpe.org/journals/march-2020/
HME has played its part in death and destruction for centuries and in our lifetime has become a significant problem globally. It is the civilian who has absorbed the brunt of its effects and the first responder has been required to bravely return situations to normal. I was never able to find an easy reference to hand when HME was encountered, something that I took to be a huge capability gap in our corporate knowledge, not least the explosion hazard but also toxicity and longer-term exposure effects. Volumes exist on primary and secondary military explosives and munitions, but HME is marginalised because of the taboos associated. As such, I have drawn on my theoretical knowledge and practical experience to provide the reader with a relatively simple publication on the most-used precursors and their explosive performance. Much of what I say is scattered throughout the public domain but this is a distillation of the facts and first-hand experience of the effects. For those pursuing a professional engineering route through the Institute of Explosive Engineers, this guide also provides reference to the chemical engineering principles used in the manufacture and formulation of home-made explosives.
With thanks to Dr Mike Cartwright for once again checking over my chemistry homework, and to my family for allowing me to play with bombs and rockets for over thirty years!
Document NOT uploaded. Requires prior clearance from UK MOD and UK Home Office
